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A B S T R A C T  
 
In 2004 Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol, one of the 
international agreements which focus on climate change 
mitigation. Russia officially participated in the Kyoto 
Protocol's first commitment period in 2005 after ensuring the 
benefits by doing so. Entering the second commitment 
period, in 2011, Russia decided to withdraw. In consideration 
of Russia's position as the most abundant fossil fuel energy 
exporter and as a country whose economy is in restoration. 
This paper analyzes Russia's withdrawal from the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol through the 
perspective of offensive realism with a qualitative 
methodology. This paper finds that foreign policy and, in a 
more modern sense, a need to take "good Samaritan," a 
politically correct role for the global community, was the 
main reason of Russia‟s' withdrawal from the Protocol. 
 
 




Pada tahun 2004 Rusia meratifikasi Protokol Kyoto, salah 
satu perjanjian internasional yang berfokus pada mitigasi 
perubahan iklim. Rusia secara resmi berpartisipasi dalam 
periode komitmen pertama Protokol Kyoto pada 2005 setelah 
memastikan keuntungan yang akan didapat setelahnya. 
Memasuki periode komitmen kedua, pada 2011 Rusia 
memutuskan untuk mundur. Mempertimbangkan posisi 
Rusia sebagai pengekspor energi bahan bakar fosil terbesar 
dan sebagai negara yang ekonominya dalam pemulihan. 
Makalah ini menganalisis faktor-faktor di balik penarikan 
Rusia dari periode komitmen kedua Protokol Kyoto melalui 
perspektif realisme ofensif dengan metodologi kualitatif. 
Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa di balik alasan penarikan 
Rusia, langkah negara itu sangat dipengaruhi oleh kebijakan 
luar negeri dan, dalam pengertian yang lebih modern, 
kebutuhan untuk mengambil peran "orang Samaria yang baik 
hati” dan yang benar secara politis bagi komunitas global  
 
 
Nur Yasmin Ghafiel, Paramitaningrum | Analysis Of Russia’s Approach To Kyoto 
Protocol: Russia’s Withdrawal From Second Commitment Period (2013-2020) 
 
   
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol IX No 2 Nov 2020 117 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.116-130.2020   
Introduction   
Russia had a crucial role in the 
ratification of Kyoto Protocol, especially 
since this country is one of the most 
significant carbon emission contributors. At 
the same time, other countries that also falls 
in the same category (the United States and 
China) refused to ratify. Thus, Russia has a 
bargaining position
1
 Due to that, the 
Protocol needs at least 55 ratifying 
countries or 55% of 1990 emission 
contributors to be enforced, and Russia 
represents 17,4% of total carbon emissions 
in said year. Such a position creates a 
mixed impact for Russia. The government 
was split into two sides on Kyoto Protocol 
ratification, noting that Russia's growing 
economy could strongly be affected. 
Although it is internally opposed, Russia 
gained support from the European Union 
(EU) to become a member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in return for 
Russia's ratification to the Kyoto Protocol.  
Aside of that tempting promise, by 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and noting that 
it is a binding agreement, Russia then 
commits to abide by the terms. 
Consequently, Russia must fulfill the given 
targets and requirements. In addition to 
that, Russia must have a specific policy 
which specifically made to internalize the 
Protocol domestically. Efforts done by 
Russia included but were not limited to 
participation in the Joint Implementation 
(JI) mechanism, the formation of the 
legislative framework and The Action Plan 
on the Kyoto Protocol, and national climate 
policy, Climate Doctrine.
2
 However, while 
being implemented, those efforts did not 
work as expected. 
Entering the Kyoto Protocol's second 
commitment period in 2013-2020, Russia 
                                                                
1
 in negotiations,  according to his ability to achieve 
a goal or agreement under their wishes.  
2
 Anna Firsova, Taplin, R., “A Review of Kyoto 
Protocol Adoption in Russia: Joint Implementation 
in Focus”, Transition Studies Review 15 (Germany: 
Springer-Verlag, 2008), 480–498. 
announced their withdrawal from the 
Protocol at COP 17 in Durban, South 
Africa, in 2011. As said by Russian 
Climate Change Envoy, Alexander 
Berditsky, "Russia will not participate in 
the Kyoto Protocol's second commitment 
period."
3
  This announcement indicated a 
change in Russia's stance to the Protocol 
from active participation to the opposite.   
It is interesting to discuss the 
causative factors that made Russia 
withdraw from the global climate change 
agreement, which is very crucial for global 
security to which Russia acknowledged. 
While other research circulate Russia's first 
period in the Protocol, there is a limited 
analysis of Russia's withdrawal from the 
second period. Considering Russia's 
national interest and position as both the 
most significant world's fossil fuel exporter 
and the world's biggest carbon emitter, 
surely the energy sector is very keenly 
observed. Therefore, it is also necessary to 
see the factors of why Russia withdrew 




This issue is discussed through the theory 
of offensive realism by John J. 
Mearsheimer from his book, “The Tragedy 
of Great Power Politics” 
4
.  Mearsheimer 
argued that: first, the international system is 
anarchy; second, the great powers have 
offensive military power; third, states will 
never be certain of other states' intentions; 
fourth, survival is the main purpose of great 
power states; and fifth, the great powers are 
rational actors. 
Furthermore, Mearsheimer argued that 
states would depend on themselves to 
                                                                
3
 Suzanne Goldenberg, "Cancun Climate Change 
Conference: Russia Will Not Renew Kyoto 




 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics, (New York: Norton, 2001) 
 
Nur Yasmin Ghafiel, Paramitaningrum | Analysis Of Russia’s Approach To Kyoto 
Protocol: Russia’s Withdrawal From Second Commitment Period (2013-2020) 
 
   
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol IX No 2 Nov 2020 118 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.116-130.2020   
ensure the safety of their country, hence the 
best strategy for states to achieve that is by 
power maximization
5
.  Also emphasizing 
on Russia‟s national interest conception, 
which according to the National Security 
Concept of the Russian Federation, is “a 
totality of balanced interests of the 
individual, society and the state in 
economic; domestic political, social, 
international, informational, military, 
border, environmental and other fields." It 
is stated that in "Ensuring national security, 
the Russian Federation involves the 
following main tasks: 
- Developing the country's economy 
and pursuing independent and 
socially oriented economic policies; 
- Radically improve the ecological 
situation in the country; 
- Ensuring national security and 
protecting Russian interests in the 
economic sphere are the priority 
thrusts of state policy." 
6
 
Regarding this case, Russia's national 
interest, especially in the economic and 
environmental fields, will be touched. In 
the economic field, it was said that Russia's 
national interest was "sustainable economic 
development." The threats to this interests 
are, among other things: "a substantial 
contraction in the gross domestic product 
(GDP); a drop in investment and innovation 
activities; the dwindled scientific and 
technological potential ... the tendency for 
the prevalence in exports supplies of fuels, 
raw materials, and energy components, and 
                                                                
5
 Colin Elman, “Realism”, International Relations 
Theory for the Twenty-First Century, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2007) p. 18; John J. Mearsheimer, 
"Structural Realism",  in T. Dunne, M. Kurki, S. 
Smith, International Relations Theory: Discipline 
and Diversity Ed.3, pp. 77-93, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 
6
 Russian Federation, National Security Concept of 





in imports supplies - food and consumer 
items, including articles of prime 
necessities.".
7
 Then, it is reasonable why 
the economy is the top priority of Russian 
policy. The economic sector will support 
other sectors such as security and the 
military, politics, society, and others. Thus, 
Russia needs a strong and stable economy. 
In the field of environment, it was stated 
that "The threat of a deteriorating 
environmental situation in this country and 
the depletion of its natural resources 
depend directly on the state of the economy 
and the society's willingness to grasp the 
globality and importance of these issues. 
For Russia, this threat is enormous because 
of the preferential development of fuel and 
energy industries, the lack of development 
in the legislative framework for 
environmental activities, the absence or 
limitations of resource conservation 
technologies, and low environmental 
awareness. There is a tendency for Russia 
to be used as a place to reprocess and bury 
materials and substances that are harmful to 
the environment.".
8
  From the 
abovementioned paragraph, it was 
concluded that Russia recognized the 
existence of flaws in the legislative 
framework for environmental activities. 
From this point of view, it appears that 
Russia handled environmental threats in its 
country into the hands of its people. It also 
appears that there is no specific vision to 
deal with this problem. Such a condition 
shows Russia's position on climate change 
and has consequences for its position on the 
regime of this issue.  
Hence, this research would discuss the 
reason behind Russia's withdrawal by 
identifying the threats and interests or 
benefits to Russia by being in Kyoto 
Protocol through the offensive realism 
perspective variables: power maximization 
and cost and benefit calculation. The first 
section explains the Kyoto Protocol and the 
                                                                
7
 Russian Federation, 2000 
8
 Russian Federation, 2000 
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dynamics in Russia's ratification process. 
The second section discusses the efforts 
done by Russia in internalizing the Protocol 
and the outcomes. The third section 
analyzes Russia's withdrawal through the 
provided perspective. The final section 
provides a concluding statement on this 
issue. 
 
Result and Discussion 
1. Protocol Kyoto and Russia’s 
Ratification 
The Kyoto Protocol is one of the 
mechanisms under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) created in 1997 in Kyoto, 
Japan. This Protocol contains an outline of 
the necessary actions needed to deal with 
climate change and strengthen the 
UNFCCC to achieve its objectives. This 
Protocol is legally binding. It sets targets 
for each Annex I member country, 
consisting of 41 industrialized countries, to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 
5% of the emission level in 1990 and to 
help developing countries overcome 
climate change. Such an arrangement is 
because of the shared understanding that 
industrialized countries are important actors 
responsible for climate change through 
industrial emissions. The Countries which 
fail in meeting their emission targets are 
required to cover the difference between 
the emission targets and their actual 
emissions, plus a 30% penalty for the 
following period. The country cannot 
participate in the emissions trade until 
considered to comply with this Protocol. 
 
Russia signed the Kyoto Protocol in 
1999 and ratified it in 2004. This 
ratification also complemented the 
requirement that the Protocol came into 
force in 2005. There was a long process to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, due to several 
problems and circumstances.  Under the 
Kyoto regulation, Russia needs to reduce 
its emissions by a target of 0%, which 
means it should not exceed its emission 
level in 1990 or around 3000 million tons 
of CO2.  By ratifying this Protocol, Russia 
has also committed to formulate and 
implement national actions and policies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In this 
effort, the Kyoto Protocol has provided 
three mechanisms, namely: (1) emissions 
trading; (2) joint implementation (JI), and 
(3) the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM).  Russia itself hoped to play a 
significant role in these mechanisms, 
especially emissions trading and JI. 
 
2. Pre-ratification Debate 
Domestically, there was a debate on 
the issue of the Kyoto Protocol's 
ratification. Legislation of the State Duma 
generally supports, except Andrei 
Illarionov, the President's economic 
adviser, who rejects Russia to ratify it. 
Illarionov rejected the idea added that 
Russia would experience an economic 
recovery and would exceed its emissions 
quota.  Russia also must comply with the 
commitment to reduce emissions, which 
would cause the country to limit industrial 
activity and energy use, which will have an 
impact on economic growth. He had a 
negative view of the Kyoto Protocol's 
ratification, mainly because it would 
hamper Russia's economic growth. 
Illarionov himself was a member of the 
Advisory Board of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences. The agency examined the Kyoto 
Protocol and revealed that it would have 
several negative impacts on Russia, such as 
the main points of his arguments: 
a. The Kyoto Protocol does not have a 
scientific or scientific basis; 
b. The Kyoto Protocol will not be 
effective in achieving the objectives 
of the UNFCCC; 
c. The warmth of the climate for cold 
Russia can have positive effects 
such as reduced energy uses for 
heating and increased food 
production; 
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d. Due to the rapid growth of GDP in 
Russia, the Kyoto Protocol can 
provide serious economic risks and 
eventually limit GDP growth. 
The industrial sector in Russia also 
believes in this. They see the excellent 
prospect of the JI project, namely 
technology the modernization, and project 
financing related to energy efficiency.  The 
industrial sector had a significant 
contribution to the Russian economy, 
especially the energy industry sector, such 
as the Gazprom company and OAO RAO 
UES (OAO Unified Energy System of 
Russia). This is because Russia has 58% of 
the total JI market with potential emissions 
reductions of more than 150 Mt CO2e. 
On the other hand, the main 
argument of the supporters is that Russia 
has an opportunity to increase its economy 
with its emission surplus quota and joint 
implementation. By regulating emission 
reduction, Russia could reduce the intensity 
of energy use and save state revenues and 
double its GDP. For example, 
environmental NGOs see that by ratifying 
the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will have a 
mechanism that regulates greenhouse gas 
emissions produced by its domestic 
activities, extraordinarily inefficient 
industries.  WWF Russia is one of the 
international NGOs that supports the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.  
However, NGOs in Russia have a limited 
role in influencing the Russian government 
due to the country's political atmosphere, in 
which the non-state actors are not one of 
the main actors.  Therefore, the negative 
opinion about the Kyoto Protocol is still 
more reliable. 
Despite all the debate, Russia saw 
that the Kyoto Protocol's ratification is 
strategic for its international exposure. 
Russia was offered to be a member of 
WTO and was given strong support from 
the EU if this country is willing to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol. Russia has been aspiring to 
join WTO since 1992.
9
The initial 
negotiation process has been postponed for 
a while because of the Russian Ruble crisis 
in 1998.
10
  When Vladimir Putin came to 
power in 2000 as a president, the prospect 
of Russian membership in the WTO 
became crucial.    
For Putin, the consideration of 
facilitating Russia becoming a member of 
the WTO is an excellent opportunity to be 
gained from ratifying it, and that Putin 
takes this into account as a political 
advantage for Russia and an achievement 
for him as President. WTO‟s membership 
will affect the growth of the Russian 
economy. According to World Bank, WTO 
membership in Russia will provide 3% 
GDP growth in the medium term and 11% 
in a long time, especially with improved 
service quality and reduced prices in the 
domestic market. 
Furthermore, Russia has a decisive 
role in this Protocol that gives Russia 
image elevation in the international 
community.  As the European Union 
strongly supports and seeks to implement 
the Kyoto Protocol, Russia's refusal to 
ratify would strongly affect its relationship 
with Europe. Russia will also be deemed 
not to support a shared agenda aimed at the 
safety of the world. Conversely, if Russia 
ratifies, Russia will be considered a 'savior' 
which helps the environmental plan. It will 
also show that Russia is cooperative with 
the European Union, one of the 
distinguished global environmental actors. 
Putin himself would be seen a good person. 
Thus, on October 22 2004, the State 
of Duma voted 334-73 and approved the 
treaty.  It can be argued that Russia's 
                                                                
9
 Yasin, Yevgeny (2002), Russia and the WTO, in 
Barysch, Katinka, Cottrell, Robert, Frattini, Franco, 
Hare, Paul Lamy Pascal, Medvedkov, Maxim, and 
Yasin, Yevgeny, “Russia and the WTO” Centre for 







Nur Yasmin Ghafiel, Paramitaningrum | Analysis Of Russia’s Approach To Kyoto 
Protocol: Russia’s Withdrawal From Second Commitment Period (2013-2020) 
 
   
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol IX No 2 Nov 2020 121 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.116-130.2020   
participation in the Kyoto Protocol's first 
commitment period was then due to 
opportunities that would benefit Russia, 
which later became an interest in making 
such decisions, including: 
- Economic benefits: Russia's 
potential to sell its 'hot air' will 
contribute significantly to the 
Russian economy. The potential for 
carrying out joint implementation 
(JI) projects is also significant so 
that participating in Russia can 
attract investors for the JI project.  
- Political advantage: The European 
Union's support for Russia‟s 
membership in the WTO will be a 
good step for the Russian economy. 
Russia will have a say in 
international trade negotiations. 
WTO membership will also help 
Russia to conduct its economic 
reform.
11
  It also shows that Russia 
– EU‟s good interaction.  
- Elevation of image: Russia's 
participation in the Kyoto Protocol 
and its ratification will improve 
Russia's image as the largest carbon 
emitter country in the world. With 
veto rights obtained by Russia after 
the United States refused to 
participate, Russia would be 
considered as the 'savior.'   
Therefore, the Russian 
government's move will be seen 
positively by the international 
community.  
 
3. Russia’s Participation and 
Protocol’s Internalization 
With the Kyoto Protocol's 
ratification, Russia needs to prepare a 
legislative and institutional framework to 
implement mechanisms within the Kyoto 
Protocol domestically. From 2006 to 2009, 
                                                                
11
 Ibid 




a. Government Regulation (Order) of 
the Russian Federation concerning 
the establishment of a Russian 
carbon unit registry to fulfil 
commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol (2006); 
b. Government Regulation (Order) of 
the Russian Federation concerning 
the establishment of a system for 
anthropogenic emissions assessment 
based on its source and elimination 
by the removal of greenhouse gases 
not regulated by the Montreal 
Protocol on ozone-depleting 
substances to fulfill commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol Article 5, 
paragraph 1 (2006); 
c. Government Regulation of the 
Russian Federation concerning 
procedures for the acceptance and 
control of the progress of project 
implementation under Articles 6 
and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol 
(2007); 
d. Government Regulation (Order) of 
the Russian Federation concerning 
the simplification of procedures for 
the acceptance, implementation, and 
control of projects under Articles 6 
and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol 
(2009). 
e. Government Regulation (Order) of 
the Russian Federation regarding 
the assignment of the Savings Bank 
of Russia Joint Stock Company as 
an entity with the power to 
participate in the trade of 
greenhouse gas emissions with the 
aim of fulfilling the commitment of 
the Russian Federation on the 
limitation and reduction of 
measured greenhouse gas emissions 
(2009).  
                                                                
12
 Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and 
Environmental Monitoring. 2014. First Biennial 
Report of The Russian Federation. Moscow: Russia. 
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The Action Plan on the Kyoto 
Protocol was made and agreed with the 
leading agencies appointed by Russia to be 
responsible for handling the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, 
namely the Ministry of Natural Resources 
(MNR) and the Russian Federal Service for 
Hydrometeorology and Environmental 
Monitoring (Roshydromet). Russia also 
created a national system to monitor 
greenhouse gas emissions and policies that 
have been poured into the Socio-Economic 
Development Program for the Medium-
Term Perspective. The website containing 
the Russian Carbon Unit Registry was also 
built for the transparency of the carbon 
registry data collection. 
13
 In 2009, Russia 
formulated Climate Doctrine, which 
contained domestic climate policy to pay 
more attention to its carbon emissions. It is 
seen that Russia was already in the process 
of institutionalizing its commitment to 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol.   
Furthermore, The Russian 
government and Russian business 
community had very high expectations of 
the Kyoto Protocol's mechanism, 
specifically the implementation of the JI 
project in Russia. The biggest energy 
companies in Russia, namely OAO RAO 
UES and Gazprom, supported the Kyoto 
Protocol's ratification because they saw the 
potential of the JI project, which was 




To implement the Doctrine, Russia 
needs to have an institutional and 
legislative framework so that successful 
project implementation efforts attract 
investors. Therefore, a collaboration with 
the business community is significant. 
However, Russia failed to develop an 
adequate framework, starting from the 
agency responsible for implementing the 
Kyoto Protocol to the uncertainty of the 
                                                                
13
 Website could be accessed via 
http://www.carbonunitsregistry.ru/ 
14
 Firsova and Taplin, 2008. 
administrative system, including unclear 
incentive system, which led to fraud and 
corruption. 
There is no clear division of 
responsibility between Russian national 
bodies. The project administration process 
does not channel funds directly to the 
project investment's recipient body, but 
through agency authority in person. The 
unclear legislative mechanism makes a 
complicated registration process. Anna 
Korppoo identified problems that hampered 
the running of the JI project in Russia in 
three aspects: institutional and legislative 
frameworks, readiness for implementation, 
and project funding from local co-funding. 
15
as a result, more than 100 JI projects 
failed to be completed in 2009, with 
potential emissions reductions of around 
240 million tons of CO2e. More than 40 
plans that have registered have also not 
been followed up until the end of 2009. 
16
 
Then, the most substantial reason 
for ratifying is the potential profit from the 
sale of Russian 'hot air'. Nevertheless, the 
income earned from emissions trading is 
not as high as predicted. "Potential hot air" 
buyers turned out to choose to buy other 
countries' carbon credits other than Russia. 
One of them is the European Union, which 
stated that they are more inclined to buy 
surplus AAUs that do not originate from 
'hot air,' which is a surplus obtained 
through concrete greening emissions 
projects. In contrast, Russia's surplus is a 
result of its economic transition from 
Soviet times. 
In the announcement of Russia's 
withdrawal in 2010, it was officially stated 
that the main reason was the lack of 
                                                                
15
 Anna Korppoo, "Russian energy efficiency 
projects: lessons learned from Activities 
Implemented Jointly pilot phase". Energy Policy 33 
(2008), 113–126. 
16
 Shishlov I. (2011). Joint Implementation in 
Russia: on track to overtake Brazil as the third-
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participation in other primary greenhouse 
gas producer states. It also said that 
countries committed in the second 
commitment period had non-environmental 
reasons such as promoting  
clean technology standards. Russia 
said it would join an environmental 
agreement which is covering all major 
emitters of greenhouse gases.  The United 
States has withdrawn from the Kyoto 
Protocol. When Russia did the same, it 
shows that the Kyoto Protocol loses another 
world's largest polluter. Therefore, the 
mitigation rate could be affected. This 
situation also stops Russia from 
participating in mechanisms the Kyoto 
Protocol provides, such as emissions 
trading and JI.  
 
Table 1. Expectation and Reality of the 
Kyoto Protocol Implementation 
Source: Authors 
 
The table shows the expectations 
and reality of the Kyoto Protocol after 
being implemented. When what was 
allegedly potential to benefit Russia was 
not achieved, it was a rational action for 
Russia to withdraw. In the absence of 
significant profits, while remaining within 
the Kyoto Protocol, Russia has resigned 
and focused on what becomes its national 
interest. 
 
Table 2. Cost and benefit to settle in 




Emissions need to be 
controlled so that it 
will have an impact on 
economic growth; 
Emissions Need to 
Be controlled to 
boost the efficient 
Energy sector. 
„Hot air' from the first 
commitment period 
cannot be sold when it 
enters the second 
commitment period; 




Cannot utilize the 
mechanisms in the 
Protocol; 
It can still use the 
mechanisms. But 
looking at the results 
of the joint 
implementation, 
Russia needs an 
adequate domestic 
legal framework; 
Russia will be bound 
by the rules of the 
Kyoto Protocol, 
limiting its emissions 
income, which 
hampers its economy, 
which is dominated by 
the fossil fuel of 
energy sector. 
Russia will be 
considered as a 
country concerned 
with the issue of 




The table above shows a cost and 
benefit calculation if Russia stays to 
participate in the Kyoto Protocol's second 
commitment period. Another additional 
impact on the economy is Russia would 
also become an industrial country that is 
under commitment to limit its emissions. 
The United States, China, Canada, and 
other industrialized countries did not 
participate, and they have withdrawn from 




1. Gaining benefit 
from emission 
trading 
Buying countries are 
uninterested 





framework is inadequate; 
thus, investors choose the 
other countries 
3. Having a bigger 
role in Protocol 
Kyoto negotiation. 
Gains bigger 
responsibility and burden 
in climate change 
mitigation 
4. Emission limit is 
far enough to be 
reached; hence 
there's no need for 
change in the 
economy. 
The second commitment 
period increased the 
emission reduction target 
to 18%. The first 
commitment period (%) 
was already concerning 
for economic growth. 
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settled, it reduces its competitiveness to 
grow its economy. 
The consideration of prioritizing the 
country's agenda to continue to use its 
fossil fuel commodities is a manifestation 
of efforts to power maximization. Russia 
still needs to rebuild its economy since its 
downfall in the Soviet Union era. For that 
reason, the Russian government relies on 
the oil and gas sector. Russia's energy and 
raw materials sector covered 50% of its 
budget revenues, more than 70% of 
Russia's exports, contributed 100% to 




Meanwhile, there was a fluctuation 
of revenue from oil and gas, due to some 
external and internal problems: (1) 
international scale conflict – Iraq -Kuwait 
War 1990s and Iraq– US conflicts in the 
year of 2000s, which affected world oil 
prices. (2) Other countries‟ domestic 
political crisis such as Venezuela‟s unrest 
in 2002 - 2003; (3) 1998‟s Financial Crisis 
which affected three Asian countries: South 
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia and 
influence their purchasing power for oil and 
gas. (4). Russia‟s territorial dispute with 
Georgia in 2008.   
The Iraq-Kuwait war in 1990 
caused another oil shock across the globe. 
The Soviet Union's GDP during that shock 
equaled about 776.8 billion dollars, and the 
country was the world's seventh economy. 
However, the economic programs of the 
Soviet Union's leaders failed at that point, 
and the Soviet Union's society faced many 
difficulties. Asian tigers and the Russian 
Federation's financial crisis caused the next 
oil price shock in 1998. On the one hand, 
Thailand, South Korea, and several other 
East Asia countries decided on changing 
the nature of their currency, imposing a 
severe shock on the financial markets. 
                                                                
17
 Balov VN “The role and the place of the mineral 
sector in socio-economic development of Russia” 
(in Russian). Bulletin „Ispolzovanie i ochrana 
prirodnich resursov v Rossii‟ 6:52–54. 
On the other hand, Russia devalued 
its currency as an OPEC nonmember. As a 
result, the petroleum price in 1998 sank to 
12 dollars per barrel. In other words, 
petroleum prices fell to its lowest level 
since 1972. The Russian Federation's GDP 
growth per year turned -5.8%, and the 
value of this country's petroleum exports 
dropped to 14.5 billion US dollars. Another 
oil price shock took place in 2003, due to 
Venezuela's unrest and the Second Persian 
Gulf War (the US- Iraq war). The Iraq 
crisis, which was one of the OPEC's 
petrostates, created disorder in the supply 
of petroleum across the globe. The internal 
turmoil in Venezuela during 2002 and 2003 
imbalanced petroleum and gasoline 
production in this country. As a result, 
petroleum prices took a sudden rise from 
about 25 dollars in 2002 to 38.3 dollars by 
the end of 2003. The oil price increase 
during this period brought about a 
remarkable increase in government 
revenues for Russia. The vast budget was 
used for the reconstruction and 
modernization of this country's economy 
(Bochkarev, 2006). According to the 
statistics by the Energy Information 
Administration, Russia increased its 
petroleum production during that shock 
from 7,6 -9,2 million barrels per day from 
2002 to 2004.
18
  The volume of petroleum 
exports of the Russian Federation also rose 
from 291 billion dollars in 2002 to 590 
billion dollars in 2004, respectively.   
Meanwhile, another oil price 
fluctuation happened during the years 2007 
to 2009, following the downturn in world 
oil production and the conflict in oil 
demand, due to Russia's domestic issues 
and some other global unrest.  In this 
period, the world oil prices rose from 50 
dollars per barrel at the beginning of 2007, 
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Ehsan Rasoulinezhad, Oil Price Shocks and Russia‟s 
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Overcoming Them, Journal of World Sociopolitical 
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2017, pp. 1-31 
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to 140 dollars per barrel in summer 2008. After that, it decreased to about 70 dollars 
in 2009. At the same time, Russia had a 
significant recession because of its military 
dispute with Georgia and the decrease in 
the substantial Urals crude oil prices. 
According to the statistics from Russia's 
central bank, the volume of crude oil 
exports reached from 121 billion dollars per 
day in 2007 to 161 billion dollars in 2008 
and 100 billion dollars in 2009. Several 
global unrests in the first half of 2011 
influenced world oil prices due to various 
reasons, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, the 
nuclear power plant explosion in Japan, the 
Arab Spring, Libya's civil war, and as the 
terror of Bin Laden. Here, the world oil 
prices reached from approximately 80 
dollars per barrel to 120 dollars. Those 
issues contributed to Russia's increasing 
income. The customs' data of the Russian 
Federation shows that the revenue from 
petroleum exports of the country increased 
from 135 billion dollars in 2010 to about 
181.8 billion dollars in 2011. Moreover, the 
oil export revenue shares equaled 53.1% of 
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 Russian Federation, Federal Service for 
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring 
of the Russian Federation, First Biennial Report of 
the Russian Federation (for UNFCCC) (Moscow, 
2014). 
Russia's total exports in 2011. In sum, 
Russia has been focusing on its oil capacity 
to stabilize its economy, since it influences 
Russia's power performance.  
Furthermore, Russia's oil capacity 
correlates with Russia's position by 
remaining within the Kyoto Protocol. 
Therefore, Russia needs to develop better 
mechanisms to limit its greenhouse gas 
emissions to meet the Kyoto Protocol 
targets. By the time of this research, Russia 
is still classified as critically insufficient
20
 
in handling climate change. Below is the 
data on emissions produced by Russia in 
the period before and entering the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol; 
they are as follows: 
  
 
                                                                
20. The Climate Action Tracker defines the term 
"critically insufficient" is one of the lowest groups 
in the commitment to be far outside the range of fair 
and inconsistent doses to maintain heating levels 
below 2 degrees Celsius from the limit of 1.5 
degrees Celsius from the Paris Agreement.  If all 
government targets are at this level, hating will 
exceed 4 degrees Celsius 
Figure 1. Russian emission data 1990-2011 
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The Kyoto Protocol bound the figure 
above shows that Russia's emissions did not 
experience significant changes in the period 
before, during, and after Russia. That figure 
also describes that it would not be any 
significant differences even when this 
country withdrew from the Protocol. In the 
first commitment period, Russia was not 
needed to reduce emissions and instead had a 
surplus of 'hot air' due to its economic 
transition. Nevertheless, in the second 
commitment period, the surplus was no 
longer used, and the emission reduction 
target was further increased, from 5% to 18% 
from 1990 levels. Thus, Russia would need 
to limit its energy use and fossil energy 
extraction, while these commodities were the 
main supporters of the economy Russia 
 
Russia has the highest energy use 
projection, poured through its "Russian 
Energy Strategy until 2035" indicating that 
Russia will continue to use existing 
resources for its economic growth.
22
 
Therefore,  Russia's involvement in the 
Kyoto Protocol will affect its industrial 
capacity. Later on, it also hampers Russia's 
economic growth, mainly because Russia is 
bound to commit to meet its emission 
reduction targets. Russian emissions have 
continued to grow since 1998 by as much as 
15% until 2006. In the same year, a 6.7% 
GDP growth helped increase greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2.6%. In 2000, President 
Vladimir Putin had set a target to double 
GDP by 2010, a target that would hamper 
                                                                
21





 Alexey Kokorin, Korppoo, A., “Russia‟s Ostrich 
Approach to Climate Change and the Paris 
Agreement”, CEPS Policy Insights No. 2017-40 
(Brussels: CEPS, 2017) 
Russia to reduce its emissions.
23
 
Consequently, commitments with regimes 
such as the Kyoto Protocol will be a barrier 
for Russia. 
 
Figure 3. Increased GDP and CO2 
emissions in Russia 1990-2010 
Source: Sharmina et al, 2013
24
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 Maria Sharmina, Anderson, K., Larkin, A., 
“Climate Change Regional Review: Russia”, (WIREs 
 
Figure 2. Projection of fossil fuel energy consumption in industrial countries 2014-2040 
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The graph above shows an increase 
in GDP accompanied by CO2 emissions in 
Russia. Russia's energy activity is the most 
significant contributor to emissions and GDP 
in Russia (See Figure 1). For that reason, 
restrictions on emissions will have an impact 
on Russia's GDP growth. 
It can be concluded that based on the 
offensive realism assumption that the state 
will maintain its survival by increasing its 
power capability. The state will tend to direct 
its policies of power maximization and self-
help, in response to an international system 
of anarchy so that the state needs to improve 
its competitive capabilities. For Russia, 
following what is stated in its national 
interest official documents, economic 
strength is the country's top priority that 
needs to be maintained and maximized. 
Thus, the utilization of energy resources is 
intensified to strengthen The Russian 
economy, since that is a major element in 
Russia's power maximization efforts. While 
energy resources are Russia's primary 
sources of wealth, therefore, Russia will 
allocate all resources to secure this sector, 
including on how to gain more benefits from 
Russia's international partnership. 
By participating in the Kyoto 
Protocol's second commitment period, those 
above-mentioned interests will be threatened 
because Russia will need to limit its carbon 
emissions. This limitation will affect Russia's 
oil production process and the consumption 
or utilization of oil resources for 
development and export activities. Oil, like 
nature, gas is an essential revenue for Russia. 
Therefore, Russia's national interests in the 
energy sector would be above the global 
agenda of climate change and the self-help 
principle. 
Furthermore, Russia already got its 
membership in the WTO, with the EU full 
supports. Being part of global and 
international trade arrangements such as 
                                                                                                 
Clim Change 4, 2013) pp. 373-396, doi: 
10.1002/wcc.236 
WTO is contributed to the creation of a right 
image of the Russian economy and Russia's 
international posture. Russia gained global 
recognition as a new and rising economy 
actor and beneficial to support Russia's 
economy. Such recognition also helped 
Russia power maximization efforts because 
indirectly will support Russia's economic 
development. Furthermore, Russia's 
participation in WTO and its system would 
become the priority. Russia's commitment to 
the Kyoto Protocol is considered less 
important because it will not have similar 
recognition that Russia gained from WTO. 
 
Conclusion 
Russia, under President Vladimir 
Putin's administration, sought to restore 
Russia to become a world power. 
Participating in the Kyoto Protocol was 
expected to be one of the steps to realize this 
ambition. However, Russia's ratification into 
the Kyoto Protocol was not because of the 
environmental reasons, which are to protect 
the planet and mitigate climate change, but 
rather to gain profits. Russia hoped-for 
benefits from its ratification, starting from 
the ease of joining the WTO to increasing 
revenues from trading in carbon emissions. 
Russia's withdrawal from the second 
commitment period was following the 
assumption of offensive realism. Russia has 
an ambition for power maximization through 
its economic growth; hence the Russian 
government protects its main economic 
supporting commodities-fossil fuel energy. 
The state as a rational actor will prioritize the 
decision that is more profitable for their 
country, and involvement in environmental 
negotiations will only be used as a tool to 
achieve his interests. The Kyoto Protocol, as 
stated by Berditsky, was no longer in the 
interests of Russia, so Russia decided to 
withdraw. Additionally, numerous factors 
that also contribute to this are: 
- Changes in regulation and 
mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol's 
second-period commitment did not 
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put Russia in an advantageous 
position. 
- The dependency of the Russian 
economy to fossil fuel energy export. 
- Lack of contingency and certainty 
within the government that there 
were different opinions regarding the 
Kyoto Protocol ratification. 
- No public pressure to the Russian 
government to enforce the Protocol 
and climate policy in general. 
- Russia's perception of climate change 
that it would not affect their country 
negatively and would rather be 
beneficial for their economy. 
For Russia, national interest is to 
increase its power capacity in the form of 
military capabilities and economic 
improvement. Besides that, other supporting 
factors are Russian expectations that are not 
in line with reality. Domestically, the 
Russian government has not prepared an 
adequate framework for implementing the 
Kyoto Protocol mechanism. Thus, investors 
tend to choose to invest in other countries. 
Emissions trading also produces no results as 
expected, mainly because of the buyer's 
country preferences and the decline in the 
price of carbon credits on the international 
carbon market. Then, the absence of internal 
pressure or government interest in climate 
change makes this issue less prioritized and 
considered in Russia. With the risks to the 
Russian economy, especially in the energy 
sector, Russia's decision to back down is no 
other to safeguard its national interests. 
Russia's withdrawal from the Kyoto 
Protocol's second commitment period was 
mainly due to Russia's prioritization of 
national interest over global interest. 
Presumably, climate change is a threat to the 
whole world, but it has not been a major 
concern for Russia. When scientific findings 
show that climate change is advantageous for 
Russia, this country applied a self-help 
approach to this issue. Thus, the authors 
conclude that the issue of climate change, 
including the Kyoto Protocol, has not been a 
top priority in policy orientation and part of 
Russia's national interests. Until then, Russia 
will continue to maximize its economic 
growth even though it means that Russia 
must continue to use fossil energy. 
Russia's dependence on its energy is 
detrimental to this country in the long run. 
Thus, actions need to be anticipated, such as 
the provision of energy diversification, 
energy efficiency, and specifically the 
development of renewable energy. 
Therefore, slowly, Russia can help the 
international community by reducing 
greenhouse gases in the design of a 
mechanism that is in line with its domestic 
situation and does not hurt the economy. 
Russia's decline and these factors did 
not make Russia abstain entirely from the 
issue of climate change. Russia still has a 
crucial role to play in the future of 
international climate governance. Because 
Russia is a country with abundant fossil 
energy reserves, the most significant fossil 
energy exporter, and a country with 
extensive blue carbon reserves. By 
developing adequate forestry and energy 
policies, Russia could have a major influence 
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